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INTRODUCTION 
Regulatory takings doctrine is famously muddled.  But for the past 
three decades, one aspect of it has been completely clear: the 
procedure for initiating a regulatory takings claim.  In Williamson 
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs claiming a Fifth Amendment 
regulatory taking allegedly caused by a state or local government must 
first seek compensation under whatever procedure is provided by the 
state.1  Only when the claimant was denied compensation through that 
procedure could the claimant assert that her property was “taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”2  Thus, until that point, no 
federal takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
could accrue.3 
 
* Associate, Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP. 
** Partner, Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP. The authors filed an amicus brief in 
Knick in support of the respondents on behalf of eight state and local government 
groups. 
 1. 473 U.S. 172, 194–95 (1985). 
 2. Id. at 175 n.1 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
 3. Id. 
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The state procedure for seeking compensation is an action for 
inverse condemnation filed in state court.4  Many state courts apply the 
Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence to such 
claims.5  To the extent they do so, under the Full Faith and Credit 
statute, the state court judgment could preclude relitigation of the 
issues decided in a further federal court action under the federal 
Takings Clause.6  Thus, claims for compensation for alleged takings by 
state or local agencies have been almost solely the province of state 
courts.7  That is, until last term when the Supreme Court decided Knick 
v. Township of Scott.8  There, the Court overruled the “state 
compensation” rule it had established in 1985 in Williamson County 
and had repeatedly reaffirmed thereafter.9  In Knick, the Court held 
that a federal takings claim may be asserted in federal court under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 as soon as the challenged regulatory action is final.10 
On its face, the Court seemed to replace one simple procedural rule 
(you must file your claim in state court) with a new simple rule (you 
may file your claim in federal court).  However, this apparently simple 
procedural change is likely to create a fair bit of confusion, on subjects 
both procedural and substantive.  That confusion will be especially 
pronounced for the participants in the arena of local land use 
regulation — local governments and property owners — as much 
regulatory takings litigation arises there. 
First and foremost, Knick will change the law applicable to takings 
claims in unknown ways.  While state courts played the primary role of 
developing takings law under the Williamson County regime, that role 
will now pass to federal courts, which are not obligated to follow the 
case law developed in the states in which they sit.  Takings plaintiffs 
 
 4. See, e.g., Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043, 1047 (Cal. 1994); see also 
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19. 
 5. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 101 
(Cal. 2002). 
 6. See San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 335 
(2005) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1978)) 
 7. As the Court noted in San Remo, “there is scant precedent for the litigation in 
federal district court of claims that a state agency has taken property in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. To the contrary, most of the cases in our takings 
jurisprudence . . . came to us on writs of certiorari from state courts of last resort.” Id. 
at 347. 
 8. 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). 
 9. Id. at 2170. 
 10. Id. The Court did not overrule the other major holding of Williamson County, 
which provides that an as-applied takings challenge is not ripe until the local 
government has rendered a final decision on the allowable use or development of the 
plaintiff’s property. Id. at 2169. 
2020] A SOURCE OF NEW UNCERTAINTY 625 
will undoubtedly take advantage of this new legal lacuna to bring 
claims previously barred by settled state law.  State and local 
governments that have developed regulatory policy, particularly land 
use policy, in reliance on over thirty years of state court precedent, 
could be in for some uncomfortable surprises. 
Second, despite the apparent simplicity of its holding, Knick 
promises new procedural uncertainty.  Although federal takings claims 
may now be filed directly in federal court (or immediately removed 
there), litigants have several tools to try to force claims, in whole or in 
part, back into state courts.  Unlike other federal constitutional claims, 
takings claims are fundamentally shaped by state law, particularly state 
property law.  And land use cases frequently involve additional claims 
under state land use statutes or state administrative law.  Thus, it can 
be expected that some litigants will seek to have those issues addressed 
in state court.  Moreover, historically, lower federal courts have been 
deeply reluctant to referee land use disputes and may lack enthusiasm 
for a new category of claims in that field.  As such, federal courts may 
be sympathetic to efforts to shift takings claims, or portions thereof, 
back to state courts. 
I. SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY AFTER KNICK 
A. New Takings Law 
Although on its face a procedural decision, Knick may profoundly 
affect the substance of takings law.  Because the lower federal courts 
— aside from the Court of Federal Claims and Federal Circuit — were 
not much involved with takings cases under the Williamson County 
regime, they had little opportunity to develop the law under the 
Takings Clause.11  Additionally, the Supreme Court decides few 
takings cases, from whatever source, and the resolution of those cases 
tends to be narrow.12  Leadership in developing takings law has thus 
 
 11. See supra note 7. That is, with the exception of developing the nuances of 
Williamson County’s state compensation requirement itself. A wide variety of federal 
cases address procedural issues under Williamson County in numerous settings. See, 
e.g., San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 330, 346; Adam Bros. Farming, Inc. v. County of 
Santa Barbara, 604 F.3d 1142, 1146–48 (9th Cir. 2010); Los Altos El Granada Inv’rs v. 
City of Capitola, 583 F.3d 674, 679–80 (9th Cir. 2009); Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC 
v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 12. In the last 20 terms, the Court has decided only 13 takings cases, and only three 
since the 2012–13 term: Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162, Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 
135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015), and Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). See ROBERT 
MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: 
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been assumed by state courts, which have issued significant decisions 
in many areas of the doctrine.13  If takings cases migrate to federal 
court, lower federal courts will be writing on a mostly clean slate. 
Indeed, it is hard to think of another field where the Court made a 
shift in the applicable law that left so much uncertainty about the new 
law to apply.  When the Court abandoned federal common law in 
diversity cases in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,14 for example, 
everyone knew state law would replace it.  Under Knick, by contrast, 
the Court has supplanted established state takings law with an as-yet 
largely nonexistent federal takings law. 
Beyond the few pillars of the doctrine erected by the Supreme 
Court, state courts have taken the primary role in building the structure 
of takings doctrine.  For example, the California Supreme Court has 
issued numerous significant decisions on the subject of exactions.  
Exactions involve the regulator’s imposition of a condition of approval 
on a land use entitlement, such as a permit, for a development project 
that requires the developer to provide something of value to the 
regulator.15  Under Nollan v. California Coastal Commission16 and 
Dolan v. City of Tigard,17 exactions of property interests in the land-
use-regulatory process are subject to somewhat heightened scrutiny.18  
These conditions may be imposed to mitigate the project’s 
environmental impacts or to offset the demands imposed by the project 
on public infrastructure or services.  In our experience in representing 
public agencies in takings litigation, exactions challenges represent a 
large share of regulatory takings claims in the land use context. 
The California court was seventeen years ahead of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in deciding that the Nollan/Dolan doctrine applies to fees 
imposed on development projects as well as the exaction of interests in 
real estate.19  Perhaps more significant, in San Remo Hotel v. City and 
 
A CHRONOLOGY 3–6 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-122.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N263-YWYV]. 
 13. As explained below, state courts have a number of comparative advantages in 
adjudicating such claims in the context of land use regulation. See infra Section I.B.i. 
 14. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 15. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 990 (Cal. 2015) 
(discussing distinction between exactions and generally applicable land use 
regulation). 
 16. 483 U.S. 825, 853 (1987). 
 17. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 18. Both cases reached the Supreme Court from the state courts. 
 19. Compare Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996), with 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 612 (2013). California’s 
extensive experience with development fees derives from the State’s early embrace of 
the anti-tax movement with the adoption of Proposition 13, which has hamstrung 
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County of San Francisco,20 the California court applied a more lenient 
standard of review for exactions that are generally applicable and 
adopted by quasi-legislative action, such as adoption of an ordinance, 
rather than imposed on a discretionary, ad-hoc basis.21  The distinction 
makes sense, as the risk the Supreme Court identified in Nollan and 
Dolan — extortionary use of land use permitting authority to extract 
unrelated goodies from permit applicants — is less of a concern where 
a local government applies uniform requirements to all new 
development in the jurisdiction.22  The Supreme Court has not yet 
considered the San Remo principle.23 
After Knick, it is unclear whether federal courts will look to state 
takings precedents for guidance, or, if they do, which precedents they 
will adopt.  This is undoubtedly an opportunity for landowners and the 
takings plaintiffs’ bar.  Now in federal court, they can bring claims that 
were previously foreclosed by the takings doctrine in their state. 
However, it will pose a real challenge for local governments as they 
make daily decisions about land use regulation.  Particularly in states 
like California, where the state courts have developed significant 
bodies of takings law, agencies that have been able to rely for years on 
settled state court precedent face new uncertainty.  Given the risk of 
large, unexpected takings verdicts, many local governments will 
undoubtedly be more conservative in their land use decisions, allowing 
landowners more intensive, and profitable, uses of their properties.  
Furthermore, previous decisions made in reliance on state takings 
cases may lead to unforeseen outcomes in the new venue of federal 
court. 
 
efforts by the state and local governments to raise revenue. See MAC TAYLOR, CAL. 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, COMMON CLAIMS ABOUT PROPOSITION 13, 37–39 
(2016). By sharply restricting property and other taxes, Proposition 13 forced public 
agencies to raise revenue to fund infrastructure and public services by imposing fees 
on the projects and activities that generate the need for them. Id. 
 20. 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002). This decision preceded the U.S. Supreme Court’s later 
decision on the application of issue preclusion under the Full Faith and Credit statute. 
See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 21. San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 103–04. Other states have since adopted this 
approach, while others have not. Compare Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Washington County, 
45 P.3d 966, 982 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (adopting approach), with Town of Flower Mound 
v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 640 (Tex. 2004) (rejecting approach). 
 22. San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 103–04. 
 23. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 628 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting uncertainty about 
whether the Court would “approve the rule, adopted in several States, that Nollan and 
Dolan apply only to permitting fees that are imposed ad hoc, and not to fees that are 
generally applicable”). 
628 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
One area where Knick almost certainly promises a change in the 
applicable law is in the statutes of limitations governing takings claims.  
Inverse condemnation claims filed in state court were, of course, 
subject to state statutes of limitations.  Insofar as Knick shifts takings 
litigation to federal court, the limitations periods applicable to takings 
claims will shift, and potentially dramatically, with repercussions for 
local government planning. 
In some states — California is a clear example — local land use 
decisions are subject to extraordinarily short statutes of limitations.  In 
California, any challenge to a decision on a proposed subdivision of 
land, for example, is subject to a strict 90-day limitations period.24  
California courts held that this short limitations period applies to 
inverse condemnation claims brought by landowners challenging 
subdivision decisions.25  Other land use statutes in California impose 
similarly short — or even shorter — statutes of limitations.26 
By contrast, Section 1983 claims, including takings claims filed in 
federal court after Knick, are subject to the personal injury statute of 
limitations in the state in which the claim arises.27  In California, that 
period is two years,28 and in other states it can be as long as six years.29  
As a result, plaintiffs who previously had to challenge land use 
decisions within three months can now wait to bring a takings claim 
years later.30 
This far longer statute of limitations creates additional uncertainty 
for local governments.  In applying the short limitations periods 
established by land use statutes, courts emphasized the importance of 
 
 24. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66499.37 (2008). 
 25. Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Cal. 1994); Honchariw v. 
County of Stanislaus, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 62, 63–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). 
 26. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65009(d)(2)(C) (2014) (“An action or proceeding 
challenging an action . . . shall be served within 180 days after the accrual of the cause 
of action.”); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30801 (1991) (establishing a 60-day limitations 
period to challenge decisions by the California Coastal Commission). 
 27. See Action Apartment Ass’n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 
1026–27 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (1963); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 
28-01-16 (1935). 
 30. Of course, if a landowner wishes to challenge a land use decision on grounds 
other than the Takings Clause, she may need to file within the shorter limitations 
periods applicable to such claims. In some jurisdictions, claim preclusion rules will 
require her to join her takings claim with these other claims. In others, however, a 
takings claim may be considered sufficiently distinct from such state statutory claims 
that it may be split off and filed separately — and much later. See Crowley v. Katleman, 
881 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Cal. 1994) (applying “primary right” doctrine governing 
preclusion). 
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certainty in land use planning.31  Allowing claims for just compensation 
to be asserted years after the challenged decision upends both land use 
and fiscal planning.  As the California Court of Appeal observed: “[If] 
persons were permitted to stand by in the face of administrative actions 
alleged to be injurious or confiscatory, and three or five years later, 
claim monetary compensation on the theory that the administrative 
action resulted in a taking for public use, meaningful governmental 
fiscal planning would become impossible.”32  Charged with protecting 
the public purse, local governments facing such long-term uncertainty 
about when claims could be brought against them are more likely to 
act conservatively in land use decisions. 
In fact, local governments are likely to be more conservative 
generally in their land use decisions, given new uncertainty about 
which legal rules apply.  Land use regulation inevitably affects the 
value of regulated properties in myriad ways.33  Takings jurisprudence 
has been famously short on clear rules for drawing the line between 
noncompensable impacts on property value and compensable 
takings.34  Knick makes that problem worse: now local governments 
cannot be sure that federal courts will apply even those principles from 
state takings cases that had been considered settled.  Moreover, those 
local governments now may not know whether their actions will be 
challenged as takings until years later.35  Rather than run the risk of 
potentially large monetary liabilities and accompanying litigation costs, 
many local governments will surely opt to regulate less stringently.36  
This, in turn, can have wide-ranging effects on communities that would 
otherwise enjoy the benefits of sound planning, including control of 
growth and exactions to fund public facilities like roads, parks, and 
schools.37 
 
 31. See, e.g., Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043, 1060 (Cal. 1994); Patrick 
Media Grp., Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1992); Warner v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Salisbury, 990 A.2d 1243, 1250 (Conn. 
App. 2010); James v. County of Kitsap, 115 P.3d 286, 294 (Wash. 2005) (en banc). 
 32. Patrick Media, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836. 
 33. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); see also id. at 417 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 34. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 340 n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 35. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 36. Cf. First English, 482 U.S. at 340–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. at 341. 
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B. New Procedural Uncertainties 
Knick also exchanged a clear procedural rule — takings plaintiffs 
must seek and be denied just compensation in state court — for a far 
murkier process in which the forum, at the end of the day, will be 
uncertain.  Knick greatly increases the chance that a federal court will 
decide a plaintiff’s claims, but it hardly guarantees it.  Some issues, 
perhaps dispositive ones, may still be litigated in state court, with some 
back and forth between fora. 
As an initial matter, Knick plainly means that either the plaintiff or 
the defendant in a Section 1983 takings suit38 may decide to invoke 
federal  jurisdiction: the plaintiff may file there in the first instance or 
the defendant may remove the case.39  That is where the certainty ends. 
The following Sections describe why local governments may seek to 
remain in, or return to, state court and the variety of mechanisms 
available to achieve that result despite Knick.  We conclude that Knick 
therefore may provide a false promise to takings plaintiffs wishing to 
litigate in federal court. 
i. Reasons to Prefer State Court 
As noted above, property owners in some states will find federal 
court a useful escape from existing state takings doctrine.40  Indeed, 
plaintiffs had for years unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari to overturn Williamson County,41 
while local governments largely supported Williamson County’s state 
compensation rule.42  Accordingly, despite Knick, local governments 
may seek to return cases, in whole or in part, to state court. 
Litigation in federal courts located farther away can be more 
expensive than in local courts — a serious concern for local 
governments, which are more likely than landowners to be repeat 
 
 38. We assume, as the Court did in Knick, that these claims will be brought under 
Section 1983. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168. Some courts have required federal takings 
claims to be framed as Section 1983 claims, see, e.g., Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates 
v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 2003), while others have recognized 
the possibility of a claim arising under the self-executing Takings Clause, see, e.g., 
Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing First English, 
482 U.S. at 345). 
 39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–45 (1948). 
 40. See supra Section I.A. 
 41. See, e.g., Arrigoni Enters., LLC v. Town of Durham, 136 S. Ct. 1409, 1409 
(2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
 42. See generally Brief for National Governors Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (No. 17-674). 
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takings litigants.43  More importantly, state courts are more familiar 
with the state property and land use law at the heart of most takings 
claims.  The Takings Clause differs from most of the other guarantees 
in the Bill of Rights in the privileged position it accords state law: the 
law that creates the property rights protected by the Clause.44 
Several interrelated strands of takings doctrine give state property 
law a central role in dictating the outcome of takings cases.45  First and 
foremost, “the first step of the Takings Clause analysis is still to identify 
the relevant ‘private property.’”46  In doing so, courts look to state 
law.47  For example, courts have looked in principal part to state law in 
defining the “parcel as a whole” to evaluate the severity of the 
challenged regulation’s impact on the plaintiff’s property.48  The 
determination of the relevant property, also referred to as the 
denominator in the “takings fraction,” can be critically significant to 
the outcome of the claim.49  If the plaintiff’s interest is construed 
narrowly, the impact of the regulation is likely to be relatively more 
 
 43. See, e.g., Eduardo Peñalver & Lior Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due 
Process, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 354 (2012) (stating that “nearly all governments will 
be repeat players in property litigation, and only a few private actors will be”). 
 44. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized “the basic axiom that 
‘[property] interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created 
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law.’” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1001 
(1984) (alterations in original) (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharm., Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 
U.S. 155, 161 (1980)); see also Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1950 (2017) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (“Our decisions have, time and again, declared that the Takings 
Clause protects private property rights as state law creates and defines them.”); Phillips 
v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998); Preseault v. Interstate Commerce 
Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Ruckelshaus, 467 
U.S. at 1003–04, 1012). 
 45. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2187–88 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 46. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1953 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 47. See, e.g., Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164 (interest accrued in trust accounts is property 
under Texas law); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001–02 (Missouri law recognized trade 
secrets as property); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44 (1960) (in Maine, 
materialman’s lien constituted compensable property interest); Collopy v. Wildlife 
Comm’n, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 625 P.2d 994, 999 (Colo. 1981) (Colorado law does not 
recognize a compensable “right to hunt wild game upon one’s own land”); New 
England Estates, LLC v. Town of Branford, 988 A.2d 229, 243 (Conn. 2010) (option 
contract not compensable property interest under Connecticut law). 
 48. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1948; see also id. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(parcel-as-a-whole inquiry should be based solely on “state property principles”); see 
also Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. Oregon, 117 P.3d 990, 998 (Or. 2005) (holding that 
under Oregon law “timber is part of the underlying real property unless it is subject to 
a contract to be cut,” and refusing to sever timber for purposes of parcel as a whole 
rule). 
 49. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944 (definition of the relevant parcel can often be 
“outcome determinative”). 
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significant.  Plaintiffs thus try to characterize their property interests as 
narrowly as possible.50 
Second, under the test adopted in Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City,51 which forms the bedrock of the Court’s takings 
jurisprudence,52 a court must consider the extent to which the 
challenged action interferes with “distinct investment-backed 
expectations.”53  In rejecting the takings claim in Penn Central, for 
example, the Court relied in part on the fact that the challenged 
regulation did not interfere with the plaintiff’s primary expectation for 
the use of its property, namely that it could continue the existing use as 
a railroad terminal.54  The reasonableness of those expectations is 
shaped in substantial part by state property law.55  As a result, a court 
considering a Penn Central claim must evaluate the applicable state 
property law to determine whether the plaintiff’s expectations were 
objectively reasonable.56 
Finally, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court 
recognized an affirmative defense where the property owner’s 
proposed land use is independently prohibited by pre-existing 
“background principles of nuisance and property law.”57  The 
background-principles defense has subsequently been applied to 
incorporate a variety of property rules created by state law.58  The 
application of such principles may differ markedly from state to state.59 
 
 50. See id. at 1952 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 51. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 52. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2005). 
 53. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; see also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005–06. 
 54. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136. 
 55. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634–36 (2001) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034–35 (1992) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring); see also Philip Morris v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 50 n.25 (1st Cir. 2002) (state 
law defined reasonable investment-backed expectations in trade secret); Allegretti & 
Co. v. County of Imperial, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1261, 1279 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(evaluating reasonableness of expectations based on state groundwater rights law). 
 56. See, e.g., Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson, 888 F.3d 445, 452 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
 57. 505 U.S. at 1031–32. 
 58. See, e.g., Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(public trust doctrine and nuisance); Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 
978, 985–87 (9th Cir. 2002) (public trust doctrine); Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283, 292 
(Alaska 2008) (fishing permits); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 
(Or. 1993) (doctrine of custom). 
 59. Compare State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676–77 (Or. 1969) 
(Oregon doctrine of custom mandates public access to dry sand beach), with Op. of the 
Justices (Pub. Use of Coastal Beaches), 649 A.2d 604, 610–11 (N.H. 1994) (dry sand 
beach private property to high-water mark). 
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Each of these aspects of takings doctrine provides a different view 
of the same landscape: the “objective rules and customs” created by 
state law that shape private property interests.60  The nature of those 
state “rules and customs” may often dictate whether regulation effects 
a taking. 
By contrast, no other Bill of Rights guarantee requires courts to 
wade so deeply, if at all, into state law.61  The existence of a property 
interest (or liberty interest) is a threshold requirement for a due 
process claim,62 but it is merely that: any interest will do.  The nature 
and scope of the plaintiff’s asserted property interest plays 
comparatively little role in the outcome of the claim.63  And state law 
questions play no role in claims under other provisions — the Free 
Exercise Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, for example.64 
Regulatory takings cases also implicate extensive bodies of state 
land use law, including planning and zoning statutes,65 statutes limiting 
exactions,66 statutes governing subdivision of land,67 and state 
constitutional provisions.68  As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
 
 60. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 61. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings 
Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 218–19 (2004); see also Knick v. Township of Scott, 
139 S. Ct. 2162, 2184 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting “the distinctive aspects of 
the constitutional right”). 
 62. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972). 
 63. See, e.g., id. at 569–71 (“[W]e must not look to the ‘weight’ . . . of the interest 
at stake.”). 
 64. Those guarantees were cited by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence in 
San Remo Hotel, in which he questioned the rationale for the Williamson County rule 
repudiated in Knick. See San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 
U.S. 323, 348–49 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 65. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Warner Robins, 807 S.E.2d 438 (Ga. 2017) (claim 
that adoption of zoning ordinance prohibiting mobile home park violated notice 
requirements of state law and effected a taking); Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe 
County., 494 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1993) (alleging zoning ordinance in violation of state 
enabling statute and regulatory taking based on denial of landfill permit); State ex rel. 
Chiavola v. Village of Oakwood, 931 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (second appeal 
in action alleging zoning ordinance violated state planning statutes and state 
constitutional provisions and effected taking); Mayhew v. Sunnyvale, 774 S.W.2d 284 
(Tex. App. 1989) (case alleging violation of Texas Zoning Enabling Act and takings 
claims). 
 66. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 436–37 (Cal. 1996) 
(applying state Mitigation Fee Act to avoid reaching takings claim based on monetary 
exaction imposed on developer). 
 67. See, e.g., Marshall v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 912 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Wyo. 1996) 
(claims for violation of subdivision statute and inverse condemnation); Bd. of 
Supervisors v. Greengael, LLC, 626 S.E.2d 357 (Va. 2006) (same). 
 68. See, e.g., Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637 (Idaho 2004) 
(challenging statute that authorized agricultural field burning as taking and on multiple 
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land use regulation is “perhaps the quintessential state activity.”69  
Courts are thus called upon in these cases to construe and apply state 
land use statutes.70  Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“state courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal courts do 
in resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal questions related 
to zoning and land-use regulations.”71 
Moreover, takings claims are routinely accompanied by claims that 
local governments have violated these land use statutes as well as 
straightforward administrative law claims that the agency’s decision is 
not supported by evidence in the administrative record.72  For example, 
in Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission,73 the plaintiff 
challenged the Commission’s jurisdiction under the California Coastal 
Act, alleging that its assertion of jurisdiction over a lot-line adjustment 
effected a taking by delaying the plaintiff’s development project.74  The 
court “recogni[zed] that a judicial determination of the validity of 
certain pre-conditions to development is a normal part of the 
development process,” and noted that “[t]he resolution of these cases 
often turns on the construction and application of complex statutory 
schemes.”75 
State courts, of course, have the principal role in creating, 
construing, and applying these diverse bodies of state law.76  In “cases 
that turn on whether the plaintiff has a property interest as defined by 
 
state constitutional grounds); Gacke v. Pork Xtra, LLC, 684 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 2004) 
(challenging statute granting animal feeding operations immunity from nuisance suit 
as taking and violation of state constitution). 
 69. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 n.30 (1982). 
 70. See, e.g., Hill-Grant Living Tr. v. Kearsarge Lighting Precinct, 986 A.2d 662 
(N.H. 2009) (construing zoning statute to determine ripeness of inverse condemnation 
claim). 
 71. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347 
(2005). 
 72. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Pitkin Cty., 872 P.2d 1269, 1273 
(Co. App. 1993) (takings claim accompanied by claims under state and local land use 
laws); Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of W. Jordan, 424 P.3d 95, 99 (Utah 2017) (takings 
claim accompanied by claims under state statutes regarding development fees); Peste 
v. Mason County, 136 P.3d 140, 143 (Wash. App. 2006) (takings claim accompanied by 
land use statute procedural and administrative law claims). 
 73. 953 P.2d 1188 (Cal. 1998). 
 74. Id. at 1192. 
 75. Id. at 1203 (citing numerous cases). 
 76. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 
702, 743 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 
U.S. 261, 276 (1997) (Kennedy, J.) (“[T]he elaboration of administrative law” is a 
“prime responsibilit[y] of the state judiciary.”); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 
(1975). 
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state law” — as noted above, a wide swath of takings cases77 — 
Williamson County’s state compensation requirement “prevent[ed] a 
federal court from reaching the merits prematurely.”78  Williamson 
County, therefore, appropriately gave state courts the first bite at the 
apple in applying their own law.79  As Justice Kagan noted in her 
dissent in the case, Knick is likely to “channel a mass of quintessentially 
local cases involving complex state-law issues into federal courts.”80 
Local governments are frequently repeat litigants which have 
developed policies in reliance on consistent application of the state law 
under which they operate.81  Many local governments will thus seek to 
have state courts resolve these state law issues even after Knick. 
ii. The Way Back to State Court 
Knick theoretically opened the federal courthouse door to Section 
1983 takings claims.82  However, as this Section describes, local 
governments still have a variety of ways to channel cases to state court, 
and they may find support from federal judges. 
Knick may have provided federal courts the authority to hear 
takings challenges to land use regulation, but it did nothing to 
overcome the long history of federal court hostility to hearing land use 
disputes.  Those courts have recognized that land use disputes present 
fundamentally local fights that federal courts should not referee.  In 
Hoehne v. County of San Benito,83 for example, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that the final-decision component of Williamson County 
“guard[s] against the federal courts becoming the Grand Mufti of local 
zoning boards.”84  The courts have thus “repeat[ed] the admonition 
that federal courts should not become zoning boards of appeal.  State 
courts are better equipped in this arena[, so federal courts] should 
respect principles of federalism . . . [and avoid] unnecessary state-
federal conflict with respect to governing principles in an area 
 
 77. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 78. Wilkins v. Daniels, 744 F.3d 409, 418 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 79. See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 
172, 194–95 (1985). 
 80. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2181 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 81. See supra note 43. 
 82. See supra note 10. 
 83. 870 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 84. Id. at 532; see also Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 348 
(2d Cir. 2005) (Williamson County recognizes that “land use disputes are uniquely 
matters of local concern more aptly suited for local resolution”). 
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principally of state concern.”85  Given the alternatives of hearing a raft 
of new takings claims or punting the underlying issues back to state 
courts for decision, these cases suggest that many federal courts will 
take the latter approach. 
Litigants looking to take advantage of that hostility have a variety of 
procedural tools to resolve issues in state court.  First, in the common 
case involving state law claims in addition to a Section 1983 takings 
claim, a party can argue that the district court should exercise its 
discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim.86  
As noted previously, many takings cases also involve claims under state 
land use statutes or straightforward state administrative law claims.87 
Second, the party seeking to go to state court may ask the district 
court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction on one or more grounds.  
Indeed, district courts have abstained when confronted with takings 
claims that were not subject to Williamson County,88 such as the now-
repudiated claims that regulation failed to “substantially advance a 
legitimate state interest.”89 
The primary candidate for abstention in takings cases is likely to be 
Pullman abstention,90 with Younger abstention possible in rare cases 
involving state or local proceedings to enforce building or zoning 
codes.91  Under Pullman, a federal court may stay the federal action 
“when: (1) the federal plaintiff’s complaint requires resolution of a 
 
 85. Harlen Assocs. v. Incorporated Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 505 (2d Cir. 
2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also United Artists Theatre 
Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir. 2003) (Alito, J.); 
Gardner v. City of Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992); Chesterfield Dev. Corp. 
v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1992); New Burnham Prairie 
Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7th Cir. 1990); Creative 
Env’ts, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982). 
 86. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1990). 
 87. See supra notes 65–68. 
 88. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 
1102–05 (9th Cir. 1998); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 
409–10 (9th Cir. 1996); Sea Cabin on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass’n v. City of North 
Myrtle Beach, 828 F. Supp. 1241, 1249–50 (D.S.C. 1993) (abstaining under Pullman to 
allow state court to evaluate case under local non-conforming use statute before 
deciding federal takings claim); see also Anderson v. Charter Township of Ypsilanti, 
266 F.3d 487, 490–91 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing district court’s abstention under 
Pullman because state and federal constitutional provisions were identical). 
 89. The Court held that such claims were not subject to Williamson County’s state 
compensation requirement because they did not seek compensation, but rather 
invalidation, of the challenged regulation. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 
(1992). The Court repudiated the “substantially advances” test in Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543–44 (2005). 
 90. R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
 91. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
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sensitive question of federal constitutional law; (2) the constitutional 
question could be mooted or narrowed by a definitive ruling on the 
state law issues; and (3) the possibly determinative issue of state law is 
unclear.”92  Under Younger, a federal court may dismiss a federal 
action that collaterally attacks an ongoing state enforcement 
proceeding, such as a code enforcement or nuisance abatement 
proceeding.93  Younger requires an ongoing state proceeding, while 
Pullman may require the federal plaintiff to initiate a state proceeding 
to resolve the question of state law.94 
As noted above, takings cases often involve a host of state law issues 
that will shape or even eliminate the federal claim and thus are natural 
candidates for Pullman abstention.95  For example, a federal district 
court in a South Carolina regulatory takings case abstained under 
Pullman because there was an unsettled question of state law regarding 
legal, non-conforming land uses that was key to the plaintiff’s takings 
claim.96  The district court recognized that whether the plaintiff 
suffered a taking turned on the outcome of the state courts’ 
determination on the non-conforming use issue, and it chose to avoid 
“making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by state 
adjudication.”97 
Finally, a federal court may certify a question of state law to the 
relevant state supreme court.98  This has occasionally occurred when 
takings claims found their way to federal court.  For example, in West 
Linn Corporate Park L.L.C. v. City of West Linn,99 the Ninth Circuit 
certified several questions to the Oregon Supreme Court.100  Two of 
the questions involved state inverse condemnation law and the 
application of Williamson County, questions which may not recur after 
Knick.  But the third — a question about the state’s law applicable to 
municipalities’ decisions to vacate public streets101 — is the kind of 
 
 92. San Remo Hotel, 145 F.3d at 1104. 
 93. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975); Herrera v. City of 
Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 94. San Remo Hotel, 145 F.3d at 1104. 
 95. See supra Section I.B.i. 
 96. Sea Cabin on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass’n v. City of North Myrtle Beach, 
828 F. Supp.1241, 1249–50 (D.S.C. 1993). 
 97. Id. at 1250 (quoting R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941)). 
 98. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 251, 293 (2006). 
 99. 534 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2008), certified question accepted, 200 P.3d 147 (Or. 
2008), certified question answered, 240 P.3d 29 (Or. 2010). 
 100. Id. at 1093. 
 101. Id. at 1104–05. 
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state law question that is likely to arise in cases involving land use 
regulation. 
Thus, Knick brings more uncertainty: while Williamson County 
prescribed a clear rule, all of these doctrines are discretionary.102  It is 
therefore impossible to predict whether a court in any given suit will 
send the parties to state court.  However, it will happen, and the federal 
courts’ demonstrated reluctance to referee land use disputes suggests 
it will happen with much greater frequency after Knick.  Moreover, 
until a body of case law develops that applies these approaches in 
takings cases, the lack of predictability about whether or how a court 
will retain jurisdiction guarantees additional litigation over these 
issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Williamson County established a straightforward rule: takings 
plaintiffs must sue in state, rather than federal, court.  Plaintiffs may 
have chafed at the rule and routinely sought to avoid it, but the rule 
itself was clear.  Knick replaced that rule with one that appears equally 
straightforward: takings plaintiffs may now bring takings claims under 
Section 1983 in federal court in the first instance.  But that simplicity is 
an illusion.  There remain many routes back to the state courts, and no 
one should be surprised if federal judges speed litigants on their way.  
But most importantly, Knick offers only new complexity for the local 
governments that have relied for decades on state takings law in 
developing land use regulation.  It will be decades more before federal 
courts have developed their own body of takings law that local 
governments may rely on. 
 
 102. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (supplemental 
jurisdiction); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996) (abstention); 
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (certification). 
